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RECENT CASES
from the continued use of outmoded common law distinctions, to-
gether with the resulting usurpation of the jury functions via di-
rected verdicts and summary judgments for the landowner, point
out the need for the abandonment of these distinctions and their
numerous exceptions; (3) the trend in the direction of Rowland v.
Christian6 is a viable trend which has not only been recognized in
Hawaii and Colorado but also in several other states, including
Minnesota and Iowa, even though none of these states could rely
on the additional statutory support available in North Dakota. Fur-
thermore, there is no need to await legislative action before re-
jecting the rigid common law distinctions and exceptions in North
Dakota. These distinctions have been judicially created and have
outgrown their usefulness in a modern society. There is no sound
reason why North Dakota should not acknowledge the Rowland trend
and adopt it.
GARY R. THUNE
DAMAGES-MENTAL SUFFERING-RECOVERY DENIED FOR ONE WIT-
NESSING INJURY TO THE PERSON OF ANOTHER WHEN NOT
WITHIN THE ZONE OF DANGER-The parents of a new-born baby
commenced an action for damages against the defendant hospital
alleging emotional and mental shock suffered by the mother as a
result of witnessing her child dropped to the tiled floor of her hospi-
tal room by an employee of the hospital. The prayer for relief in-
cluded additional medical expenses required for the child's care and
hospitalization of the mother during this period.
On a motion for summary judgment, the trial court dis-
missed the part of the complaint seeking damages for the mother's
emotional and mental shock. In hearing the plaintiff's appeal,1 the
65. 4A N.Y.U.L. REv. 426 (1969). In discussing the restriction placed on the province
of the jury by the common law classifications, the writer states:
Where such cases do reach the jury, It is often for consideration of the
plaintiff's status rather than for the more fundamental question of whether
defendant has acted carelessly. Thus the jury is deprived of the flexibility
necessary to allow it to assess the burden of liability on the facts of each
case in accord with community standards. Furthermore, injustice may result
from the possibility that meritorious claims may never be brought because
the prudent advocate recognizes that recovery will be denied before he is
allowed the opportunity to demonstrate the unreasonableness of the de-
fedant's conduct.
Id. at 430-31 (footnotes omitted).
66. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561 (1968).
1. The defendant moved for dismissal on the ground that there was a delay in per-
fection of the appeal. The court denied the motion, citing Hogan v. Knoop, 191 N.W.2d 263,
264 (N.D. 1971) which held that if delay has not resulted in prejudice to the respondent
the motion will be denied. Whetham v. Bismarck Hospital, 197 N.W.2d 678, 679 (N.D.
1972).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Supreme Court of North Dakota held that recovery would be per-
mitted only if the defendant's negligent act had threatened the
plaintiff herself with harm or placed her within the zone of danger.
The complaint contained no facts to support this contention, there-
fore the judgement dismissing the action was affirmed. Whetham
v. Bismarck Hospital, 197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972).
There are three views on the permissibility of tort actions,
for the recovery of damages by one suffering mental anguish as
a result of witnessing injury to another or the fear that a third
person will be injured. These views demonstrate the judicial restric-
tions that various courts have placed on bystander recovery for
mental distress.2
The traditional rule denying recovery is expressed in terms of
impact or contemporaneous physical injury. This is based on the
proposition that emotional distress accompanied by physical injury
as a result of the defendant's negligent acts is not compensable
unless there has been a physical impact upon the plaintiff.8 The
rationale for the impact requirement is that it provides assurance
that the mental distress is real.4 So, in jurisdictions where impact
is required to recover for mental distress, compensation is denied
in the situation where the mental suffering is the consequence
of injury to another. 5 The Court in Whetham expressly rejected the
impact rule requiring contemporaneous physical injury to permit
2. See Amdursky, The Interest in Mental TranquAlity, 13 BUFFALO L. REV. 339 (1964) ;
Goodhart, The Shock Cases and Area of Risk, 16 MOD. L. REv. 14 (1953); Magruder,
Mental and Emotional Disturbances in 'the Law of Torts, 49 HARv. L. REV. 1033 (1936) ;
Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli,
30 VA. L. REv. 193 (1944).
3. The impact rule is followed by a minority of Jurisdictions today and "is destined
for rapid extinction, and might perhaps even never be applied again." W. PRoSsER, THE
LAW OF TORTS § 54, at 332 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
The impact rule has recently been rejected in a number of jurisdictions. See. Robb
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 58 Del. 454, 210 A.2d 709 (1965), Daley v. La Croix, 384 Mich. 4,
179 N.W.2d 390 (1970) ; Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12 (1965) ; Battalla v.
State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 176 N.E.2d 729 (1961); Niedernan v. Brodsky,
436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970) ; Savard v. Cody Chevrolet, Inc., 126 Vt. 4.05, 234 A.2d
656 (1967).
4. A number of courts have found that the slightest impact is sufficient to permit
recovery and "a Georgia circus case (Christy Bros. Circus v. Turnage, 38 Ga. App. 581,
144 S.E. 680 (1928)) has reduced the whole matter to a complete absurdity by finding
'impact' where the defendant's horse 'evacuated his bowels' into the plaintiffs lap."
PROSSER, supra note 3, at 331.
5. The reasons given for the impact rule were of a three-fold nature. First, there
was the difficulty of proving causation between the claimed damages and the alleged
mental distress; second, there was a fear of fraudulent or fictitious claims; and third,
the courts reasoned that any other rule would cause a flood of litigation. The courts
that have abandoned the impact rule have rejected these reasons because 1) the advance-
ment of medical science since the rule's adoption and the inconsistency of allowing re-
covery where the slightest impact is present refutes the claim of difficulty in proving
causation; 2) inherent in the judicial system is the ability to detect false and fraudulent
claims and such claims arise no more often than in cases where slight impact is present;
and 3) the jurisdictions abandoning the impact rule have not shown an increase in liti-
gation, and an increase in work-load is not a valid objection anyway. The plaintiff
should be given an opportunity to present his claim. Niederman V. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401,
261 A.2d 84, 85'-89 (1970).
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recovery for the consequences of mental suffering negligently in-
flicted.6
In the jurisdictions that have abandoned the impact rule, the
zone of danger test is usually applied to determine recovery for
mental distress. This represents the weight of authority in American
jurisdictions.7 The rule is applied to determine whether a legal
duty is owed to the plaintiff." A duty is found if the plaintiff
fears for his own safety, and being within the zone of danger, is
threatened with immediate physical harm.9
The zone of danger test focuses on the personal safety of the
plaintiff. Given the requirement that the plaintiff must be within
the danger zone to recover, mental suffering with resulting physical
injury to or fear for the safety of another is eliminated due
to the lack of one of the essential elements for recovery. 10 Until
recently, the only cases permitting recovery of damages for mental
distress as a result of fear for another were old lower court
decisions "probably to be explained on the basis of threatened physi-
cal injury to the plaintiff herself."'" This development in the law
occurred despite an attempt by the framers of the Restatement of
Torts to provide recovery for one suffering emotional and mental
6. Whetham v. Bismarck Hospital, 197 N.W.2d 678, 684 (N.D. 1972).
7. Strazza V. McKittrick. 146 Conn. 714, 156 A.2d 149 (1959); Resavage v. Davies,
199 Md. 479, 86 A.2d 879 (1952); Williamson v. Bennett, 251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E.2d 48
(1960) ; Frazee v. Western Dairy Prods., 182 Wash. 578, 47 P.2d 1037 (1935) ; Klassa v.
Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 273 Wis. 176, 77 N.W.2d 397 (195). See note 3 supra. See also
Annot., 29 A.L.R.3d 1337 (1970).
8. The leading case invoking the zone of danger doctrine is Waube v. Warrington,
216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935). This was an action seeking recovery for the inte-
state's death as a result of witnessing her child's death after being struck by defendant's
automobile.
The court denied recovery analyzing the right of the plaintiff in terms of duty
rather than proximate cause. In applying this concept the court stated that: "The an-
swer must be reached by balancing the social interests involved in order to ascertain bow
far defendant's duty and plaintiff's right may justly and expediently be extended." Id.
at 501. The doctrine that "[niegligence is not actionable unless it Involves the Invasion
of a legally protected interest, the violation of a right .... The plaintiff sues in her own
right for a wrong personal to her, and not as the vicarious beneficiary of a breach of
duty to another." This language was adopted from Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248
N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928). As applied to the case, the 'plaintiff was not permitted
to recover because the defendant's duty was to use ordinary care to avoid injuring those
who may be put in physical peril as a result of a breach of this standaxd. However, this
duty could not be extended to allow recovery by "one out of the range of ordinary physi-
cal peril as a result of the shock of witnessing another's danger." Waube v. Warrington,
216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497, 501 (1935).
9. Strazza v. McKitterick, 146 Conn. 714, 156 A.2d 149 (1959) ; Klassa v. Milwaukee
Gas Light Co., 273 Wis. 176, 77 N.W.2d 397 (1956). The injury must be the result of fear
for oneself not fear for another when the injury could have been the result of both.
Recovery has been permitted without making the distinctions between fear for
oneself and fear for one's children. Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182 (1933).
10. See Brody, Negligently Inflicted Psychic Injuries: A Return to Reason, 7 VILL. L.
REv. 232 (1962).
11. PROSSER, supra note 3, at 334, citing Spearman v. McCrary, 4 Ala. App. 473, 58 So.
927 (1912) ; Cohen v.Ansonia Realty Co., 162 App. Div. 791, 148 N.Y.S. 39 (1914) ; Gu,
C. & S. F. Ry. v. CooPwood, 96 S.W. 102 (Tex. Clv.,App. 1906).
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distress as a result of witnessing injury to another in a situation
similar to that presented in the Whetham case. 12
The third view of mental distress has evolved from the 1968
California Supreme Court decision in Dillon v. Legg.18 Recovery
was permitted for mental suffering, with consequent bodily injury,
caused by fear of danger or injury to a third person. Although
Dillon has not been adopted in other jurisdictions, it represents the
liberal view in permitting recovery for mental distress.
There are two leading cases in California that involve recovery
for mental distress and consequent bodily injury resulting from
fear for another's safety. In Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel and Supply
Co.,1 4 the plaintiff's mother sought to recover for fright and nervous
shock with consequent bodily injury suffered as she helplessly watch-
ed her seventeen month old son being run over by defendant's truck.
The Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal because the "complaint
did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action ... "15
The decision was reached by balancing the "plaintiff's undoubted
interest in freedom from invasion of her bodily security"18 with
administrative, socio-economic and moral factors. The administrative
factors concerned the effective administration of the judicial process
in the promotion of justice including questions of proof- and the
limits of liability for the infliction of mental suffering as a result
12. The RESTATEMENT OF ToRTS . 313 (1934,) contained a caveat in which the Ameri-
can 1,aw Institute exprpssed no oninion Ps to whether negligent conduct causing bodily
harm to a spouse or child and witnessed by the parent or spouse with resulting mental
distress would make the actor liable in an action to recover for the illness or bodily
harm resulting from fear for another.
13. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912 (1968).
14. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel and Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 379
P.2d 513 (1963) (three Justices dissenting). The plaintiff declined to amend the com-
plaint to state that recovery was predicated on "fear of her own safety." Id. at 298, 29
Cal. Rptr. at 34, 379 P.2d at 514.
15. Id. at 298, 307-09, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 34, 40-41, 379 P.2d at 514, 520-21. In determin-
ing whether the complaint stated a cause of action, the court approached the issue from
the standpoint of whether there was a duty owed by the defendant to the injured party
and adopted the view expressed in Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497
(1935). The determination of the existence of a duty and the scope of his duty was a
matter of law to be determined by the court. The existence of a duty was more than
just a question of foreseeability. If the Jury Is allowed to determine the existence of a
duty as well as the violation of this duty through application of a "foreseeabflity formu-
la," the same test is used in determining two distinct issues. Secondly, the duty is de-
termined as a matter of law since "it]here is a legal duty on any given set of facts only
if the court or legislature says there is a duty." Id. at 309, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 41, 379 P.2d
at 521.
16. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel and Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 310, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33,
42, 379 P.2d 513, 522 (1963).
17. In considering the problems of proof involved in mental suffering cases the court
was concerned with the question of: "[W]hether in this area of inquiry where emotions
play so large a role the law has now become sufficiently responsive to scientific reality
to redress the 'net balance of justice.' ' Id. at 312, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 43, 379 P.2d at 523.
In response to this question the court stated that: "The question is a disturbing one,
and cannot be answered merely by invoking the rule that a conflict of expert testimony
is for the jury." Id. at 312, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 43, 379 P.2d at 523.
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of witnessing injury to another. ' The socio-economic and moral
factors involved included the question of the point at which the
negligent defendant's liability ceased, since one cannot be liable
to the end of time for the consequences of a single act.19 These fac-
tors were to determine the point at which the defendant's duty and
the plaintiff's right ceased to exist. After balancing these factors
the Amaya court denied recovery because the defendant's liability
could not be extended to include the Amaya fact situation.2 0
Approximately five years later, the California Supreme Court
reversed the Amaya decision in Dillon v. Legg.21 In Dillon, the
plaintiff sought compensation for emotional shock and physical in-
jury suffered as a result of witnessing the defendant's automobile
negligently collide with and subsequently cause the death of the
plaintiff's minor daughter.22 The court reversed the trial court's
dismissal of the mother's cause of action. The California Supreme
Court thus became the first upper court in an American jurisdic-
tion23 to hold that a parent outside the zone of danger and not in
fear for her own safety could recover for emotional distress and
consequent physical injuries suffered as a result of witnessing an
18. In determining the limits of liability In mental suffering where the nhysical In-jury is to a third oerson, the court examined limitations suggested by Dean Prosser, in-
cluding the requirements that: 1) the injury that was threatened or inflicted is serious
enough to cause shock and resulting physical harm: 2) the action can be "confined to
the members of the immediate family :" and 3) the nlaintiff may be required to be pres-
ent at the accident or the resulting "shock must be fairly confemporaneous" with the
accident. These limits were rejected as arbitrary, but it was held that the socio-economic
factor required that at some point liability for negligence ceases. Id. at 312-13, 29 Cal.R'tr. at 43-44, .79 P.2d at 523-24. See PROSSeR, supra note 3, at 334-35.
19. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 313, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 44,
379 P.2d 513, 524 (1963) : Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MIcH. L. REV. 1, 24 (1953).
20. Recovery is denied because: 1) "[T]he social utility of such activities [such as
use of the streets and highways in commerce] far outweighs the somewhat speculative In-
terest of Individuals to be free from the risk of the type of injury here alleged."; and,
2) "As long as our system of compensation Is based on the concept of fault, we must
also weigh 'the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct."' Conduct which is
negligent rather than intentional has less moral guilt attached and the social utility of
such conduct is considered greater when these factors are balanced. Id. at 314-15, 29 Cal.
Rptr. at 45, 379 P.2d at 525.
21. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912 (1968).
22. Three causes of action were instituted in the superior court: 1) an action for the
wrongful death of the child, 2) an action for the emotional distress and physical injury
received by the mother as a result of witnessing the accident, and 3) an action for the
emotional distress and physical injury of the decedent's sister resulting from witnessing
the a'cident. The trial court dismissed the mother's cause of action but denied a motion
for :summary Judgment on the sister's claim because of the possibility that she had been
within the "zone of danger or feared for her own safety." Id. at 731-32, 69 Cal. Rptr.
74-95, 441 P.2d at 914-15.
23. The landmark English decision in Hambrook v. Stokes Bros. [1925] 1 K.B. 141
(C.A. 1924) was an action seeking damages by a husband for the loss of his wife's
services. The wife suffered from emotional distress and physical injuries which ultimately
caused her death as a result of the defendant's negligence In leaving a truck 'parked at
the top of a steep narrow street when it subsequently rolled down the incline. The mother
had been walking up the .street with her children, and they had Just parted when she
saw the vehicle approaching. The mother's fear for the safety of her children resulted in
nervous shock. The trial court's instructions required that the mother must have feared
for her own safety before recovery would be allowed. However, on, appeal the court al-
lowed the cause of action notwithstanding the fact that the fear was for the safety of
her children. The decision was based on the breach of a duty which was "[a] duty to
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injury causing the subsequent death of her child.24
Initially the Dillon court noted that the case differed from Amaya,
since the complaint presented a claim by a mother who was not
within the zone of danger as contrasted with the claim of a sister
who may have been within the zone of danger. 25 The court rejected
the zone of danger rule in Dillon, reasoning that it was an illustra-
tion of the "hopeless artificiality" of a rule which permitted recovery
in one case and not in another merely because of the location of the
claimants to the accident. Further, the impact rule has been reject-
ed in California. Therefore, the zone of danger concept could
not stand since, "the only reason for the requirement of presence
in that zone lies in the fact that one within it will fear the danger
of impact."' 6
The courts in the past have denied recovery for mental suffer-
ing resulting from fear for another because of the absence of a duty
owed to the plaintiff. In analyzing the concept of duty, the Dillon
court noted that the two reasons for denial of a duty have been
1) the fear of fraudulent claims 27  and 2) the foreseeability of
the risk. 2  Dillon rejected these reasons and promulgated guide-
lines to assist in determining the existence of a duty. These guide-
lines asked:
(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the ac-
cident as contrasted with one who was a distance away from
it.
(2) Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional
impact upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous
observance of the accident, as contrasted with learning of
the accident from others after its occurrence.
(3) Whether plaintiff and the victim were closely related,
as contrasted with an absence of any relationship or the pres-
ence of only a distant relationship. 29
use reasonable care to avoid Injuring those using the highway. It is thus a duty owed
to all wayfarers, whether they are injured or not; though damage by reason of the
breach of duty is essential before any wayfarer can sue." Id. at 156 (Atkin, L.J.). The
application of this case has been limited In subsequent English dectsions. Dillon v. Legg,
68 Cal. 2d 728, 744-46, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 82-84, 441 P.2d 912, 922-24 (1968).
24. The Dillon decision has been rejected in New Hampshire, Jelley v. LaFlame, 108
N.H. 471, 238 A.2d 728 (1968) ; New York, in Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 301
N.Y.S.2d 554, 249 N.E.2d 419 (1969), and Vermont, Guilmette v. Alexander, 128 Vt. 116,
259 A.2d 12 (1969).
25. See note 22 supra.
26. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 733, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 75, 441 P.2d 912, 915 (1968).
27. Id. at 735-37, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 77-78, 441 P.2d at 917-18. The court rejected this
reason as unsound because by a per se elimination of all claims the courts are escaping
from their responsibility of providing remedies for sound claims. The judicial process
itself must determine whether the claims asserted are fraudulent and this problem may
be no more prevalent than in other areas of tort law.
28. Id. at 739-40, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79-80, 441 P.2d at 919-20. The court would not
draw a distinction between the "zone of danger of physical impact" and the "zone of
danger of emotional Impact" and, as foreseeability is a major element of every case, it
is necessary to determine the presence of a duty on a case-by-case basis.
29. Id. at 740-41, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80, 441 P.2d at 920. These guidelines are similar to
those suggested by PROSSER. See note 18 supra.
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These factors are to be used to indicate the degree of foreseeability
so that a determination may be made as to "whether the accident
and harm was reasonably foreseeable." The determination will
be made on a case by case basis to permit the areas of liability
to be mapped out by applying these standards to the fact situation
presented.30
Application of the Dillon holding to subsequent cases in which
recovery for mental distress and resulting physical injuries is sought
requires adoption of the general tort concepts of negligence, fore-
seeability and proximate cause. The limits of liability, though not
defined, are restricted by the guidelines established by the court
and provide a test of reasonable foreseeability in determining the
existence of a duty.31 The court explicitly confined its holding
to situations where the plaintiff's shock results in physical injury.32
An independent cause of action was not created by this holding.
Rather, the recovery for emotional shock is "parasitic to" a breach
of duty to the child. If a contributory negligence defense is success-
ful, recovery will be denied.33 It is too early to ascertain what
the ramifications of the Dillon decision3" will be.
Despite the landmark California Supreme Court decision in Dil-
lon, the Court of Appeals of New York in Tobin v. Grossman"3 denied
recovery for mental and physical injuries resulting from fear for
another. The plaintiff mother brought an action to recover for
mental and physical injuries which she suffered as a result of view-
ing serious injuries sustained by her child's involvement in an auto-
30. Id. at 74.0, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81, 441 P.2d at 921.
31. Several commentators have praised the Dillon decision. Dean Prosser stated:
It seems sufficiently obvious that the shock of a mother at danger or harm
to her child may be both a real and a serious injury. All ordinary human
feelings are In favor of her action against the negligent defendant. If a
duty to her requires that she herself be in some recognizable danger, then
It has properly been said that when a child Is endangered, It is not beyond
contemplation that its mother will be somewhere In the vicinity, and will
suffer serious shock. . . . Yet It is equally obvious that if recovery is to be
permitted, there must be some limitation.
PROSSER, s pra note 3, at 334. See 2 IF. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 18.4 at
1039 (1956) ; REorATEMENT OF TORTS, Caveat, § 313 (1934).
32. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 740, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 80, 441 P.2d 912, 920 (1968).
33. The court stated in dictum that, "In the absence of the primary liability of the
tortfeasor for the death of the child, we see no ground for an independent and secondary
liability for claims for injuries by third parties. The basis for such claims must be ad-
judicated liability and fault of defendant; that liability and fault must be the founda-
tion for the tortfeasor's duty of due care to third parties who, as a consequence of such
negligence, sustain emotional trauma." Id. at 733, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 76, 441 P.2d at 916
(1968).
34. In Archibald v. Brauerman, 275 Cal. App. 2d 253, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969) re-
oovery was sought by a mother for emotional distress and mental illness suffered as a
result of viewing her son's injuries. The plaintiff mother did not witness the explosion
which caused the injury to her son. However, she appeared at the scene within moments
thereafter. The court of appeals reversed the summary Judgment, and by applying the
Dillon guidelines determined that recovery would be permitted upon the proof of negli-
gence.
36. Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 30-1 N.Y.S.2d 554, 249 N.E.2d 419 (1969).
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mobile accident86 The court, affirming the motion to dismiss, stated
the well-established rule that a cause of action seeking recovery
for unintended harm as a result of injuries to another does not
exist regardless of the witnessing of the accident or the relationship
of the parties.3 7
The Tobin court's decision was based on the zone of danger
rule and adoption of the policy reasons developed in Amaya v. Home
Ice, Fuel and Supply Co.38 Rejection of the impact rule was ac-
knowledged. However, the court reasoned that the plaintiff could
recover only if the scope of the duty was extended to create
a new duty and cause of action.3 9 It felt that broadening of the
tort concepts because of "new technological, economic, or social
developments" would be required to achieve "a corresponding legal
recognition. ' ' 40 But it thought that once liability is extended by ap-
plication of a foreseeability test, it would be impossible to confine
it within the limits. of public policy. 41
Thus, Tobin rejected the guidelines suggested by the California
Supreme Court in Dillon, calling them arbitrary distinctions because
of the number of variables presented by allowing unlimited liability.
The New York court was concerned with the difficulty of "holding
strict rein on liability" and it was content to impose liability only
when persons were directly threatened with physical danger.4 2
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 313 (1) (1965), states:
If the actor unintentionally causes emotional distress to an-
other, he is subject to liability to the other for resulting ill-
ness or bodily harm if the actor (a) should have realized
that his conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing
the distress, otherwise than by knowledge of the harm or
peril of a third person, and (b) from facts known to him
should have realized that the distress, if it were caused,
might result in illness or bodily harm.
36. The complaint alleged that the mother witnessed the accident. However, a pre-
trial examination disclosed that the accident did not occur In her "presence" but that she
was close by, and, upon hearing screeching brakes, she went to the scene. The court
took the pleadings as true in determining the motion to dismiss. Id. at 611-12, 301 N.Y.S.2d
at 555, 249 N.E.2d at 419-20.
37. Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 249 N.E.2d 4,19 (1969).
38. Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel and Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 379 P.2d
513 (1963).
39. Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 613, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 556, 249 N.E.2d 419,
421 (1969). See Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 733, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 76, 441 P.2d 912,
916 (1968).
40. Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 615, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 558, 249 N.E.2d 419, 422
(1969).
41. Id. at 616-17, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 559-60, 249 N.E.2d at 423.
42. Id. at 618-19, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 561-62, 249 N.E.2d at 424. In applying the zone of
danger test recovery has been permitted where the parent fears for his child's as well as
his own safety. Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 937, 165 A. 182 (1933). The court in Dillon
attacked this as promoting fraudulent pleadings to allege fear for one's safety. How-
ever, the Tobin court did not address this issue.
748
RECENT CASES
Section 313 (2) applies the rule stated in subsection (1) only to those
who are within the zone of danger and only if the negligent conduct
of the actor has caused an unreasonable risk of bodily harm.4 3 Thus,
the Restatement (Second) of Torts reflects the weight of authority
in American jurisdictions today.
The Supreme Court of North Dakota has adopted the majority
position. To recover for mental distress the plaintiff must have been
threatened with harm or have been in fear of physical impact by
being within the zone of danger. The court's holding in Whetham v.
Bismarck Hospital44 reflects the reasoning expressed in Amaya,
Tobin and the Restatement (Second) of Torts. In determining
whether a cause of action had been stated, the court examined
the arguments advanced by the two California decisions and the
recent New York case. In adopting the zone of danger test the
court necessarily rejected the guidelines established in Dillon. The
Whetham court quoted extensively from the dissent in Dillon which
opposed the infinite liability, arbitrary standards, and undetermin-
able distinctions which result from the application of the Dillon
approach.
45
Whetham seems to have been a fitting case for the application
of the guidelines established by the Dillon court.46 The general tort
concepts of negligence, foreseeability, and proximate cause as ap-
plied to the hospital employee would have permitted recovery. In
determining whether a duty was owed, the plaintiff would have had
to prove that it was reasonably foreseeable that a parent witnessing
the accident would suffer emotional and mental shock after seeing
her child dropped to the floor and hearing the impact. In Whetham
the plaintiff was in the hospital room when the accident occurred,
43. A change has been made in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS by elimination
of the caveat contained in § 313 of the first RESTATEMENT OF TORTS. The change was
made to represent the weight of authority although "a number of those Present at
the Institute meeting, [felt] that the situation of a mother who sees her child negli-
gently killed before her eyes Is one In which recovery would be justified." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS, Reporter's notes, Appendix § 313 at 11 (1966).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 313(2), comment d at 114 (1965) states an
example where recovery would not be permitted:
Thus, where the actor negligently runs down and kills a child in the street,
and its mother, in the immediate vicinity, witnesses the event and suffers
severe emotional distress resulting in a heart attack or other bodily harm
to her, she cannot recover for such bodily harm unless she was herself In
the path of the vehicle, or was in some other manner threatened with bodily
harm tb herself otherwise than through the emotional distress at the peril
to her child.
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436 (1965).
44. Whetham v. Bismarck Hospital, 197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972).
45. Id. at 682-83.
46. This conclusion is reached on the assumption that at trial the plaintiff could
prove she suffered consequent bodily injury resulting from the emotional distress. In
the prayer for relief, the complaint states "that as a direct and proximate result of such
negligence, Dixie [mother] suffered a severe emotional and mental shock, for which she
now seeks recovery in money damages." Id. at 679 (emphasis added).
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the emotional shock was the result of observing the negligent
act, and the mother-child relationship existed. Thus, the guidelines
under which recovery was permitted in Dillon were met.
The fact situation in Whetham seems more compelling in requir-
ing an expansion of liability than in the other cases the court con-
sidered. In those cases the social utility of limiting liability for the
users of the highways was balanced against the desirability of al-
lowing recovery for a bystander's mental distress. Public policy
overcame the fear of unduly burdensome liability in this situation.
However, in Whetham, the concern was with the negligence of a
hospital which is in the business of providing the services essential
for the health and welfare of the patients it serves. As such the
social utility of the defendant's conduct is outweighed by public
policy, thus requiring an extension of the concept of duty to permit
recovery on these facts. As the Dillon court pointed out, the extension
of liability should be determined on a case by case basis through
the use of general guidelines to determine whether the injury suf-
fered was reasonably foreseeable. An independent liability is not es-
tablished. Rather, recovery by the third person is dependent on a
breach of a duty to the person directly harmed.
In conclusion, the future of the extension of liability for recovery
for injury sustained by mental suffering resulting from a fear
of injury to another is not clear. The success of the Dillon doctrine
will depend on the ability of the courts to apply the guidelines 47 in
defining liability.48 However, an intelligent application of these stan-
dards provides reasonable limits. Elimination of the arbitrary "zone
of danger" rule and application of a reasonable new standard would
provide litigants such as the plaintiff in Whetham the opportunity
to present a prima facie case for judicial determination. 49
DAMON E. ANDERSON
47. See note 18 supra.
48. See note 34 supra.
49. See Comment, Negligence-Inflition of Emotional Harm--A Suggested Analysis,
54 IOWA L. Rgv. 914 (1969) ; 13 S.D.L. REv. 402 (1968).
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